Part Two: The 1715
By the early 18th century, the Jacobite cause had not disappeared - it had simply been waiting. Lurking in the shadows, waiting for a sign that the time was right to reveal itself once more.
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Part Two: The 1715
By the early 18th century, the Jacobite cause had not disappeared - it had simply been waiting. Lurking in the shadows, waiting for a sign that the time was right to reveal itself once more. In 1707, Scotland and England had joined together in the Act of Union. The United Kingdom was formed, and indeed it has lasted until this day. Yet, like today, the Union has always been a point of contention for many in Scotland. Some of those who wanted a return to an independent Scotland saw Jacobitism as the remedy to Union with England.
This was intensified further in 1714, when Queen Anne died without an heir. Under the terms of the Act of Settlement, the crown passed not to the exiled Stuart line, but to George, Elector of Hanover. He became George I of Great Britain. To many, this ensured a stable Protestant succession. But to Jacobites, it confirmed their fears - the rightful line had been deliberately bypassed.
James Francis Edward Stuart, the son of James VII and II, was still in exile. To his supporters, he was James VIII of Scotland and III of England. The moment seemed right to restore him. In Scotland, leadership fell to John Erskine, Earl of Mar. A politically ambitious and somewhat unpredictable figure, Mar had previously supported the government but now switched sides. In September 1715, he raised the Jacobite standard at Braemar, calling clans and supporters to arms.
The response was significant, though uneven. Much of the north and parts of the Highlands rallied. But crucially, support was not universal. Many powerful clans stayed neutral, and others sided with the government. Jacobitism was never a united movement. That lack of cohesion would prove decisive.
Mar’s army grew to several thousand men, but leadership quickly became a problem. He lacked clear strategy and decisive command. In November 1715, his forces met a government army at the Battle of Sheriffmuir, near Stirling. The battle itself was confused and inconclusive. One wing of the Jacobite army drove the government forces back, while the other collapsed under pressure. By the end of the day, neither side had secured a clear victory. Strategically, however, it was a failure for the Jacobites. They had not broken government control, nor advanced their position.
Meanwhile, in England, a smaller Jacobite rising failed to gain momentum and was defeated at Preston. This highlighted a critical weakness: without strong English support, any attempt to restore the Stuarts faced enormous limits. James himself arrived in Scotland in December 1715 - but too late to change the outcome. By then, momentum had stalled, and government forces were regaining control. Within weeks, it was clear the rising had failed. James returned to exile, and Mar followed soon after.
Experts tend to view the 1715 uprising as a missed opportunity rather than a decisive collapse. The Jacobites had numbers, and for a moment, they had momentum. But poor leadership, divided support, and lack of coordination undermined the effort. More importantly, the rising exposed a pattern that would repeat. The Jacobite cause could inspire loyalty and raise armies - but turning that into victory required unity, leadership, and wider backing that it struggled to achieve.
The cause was not finished. But after 1715, it was clear that restoring the Stuarts would not be simple. Any future attempt to restore the Stewart family to the throne would need more than belief alone.